Electronic tickets (e-tickets) are electronic versions of paper tickets, which enable users to access intended services and improve services' efficiency. Generally, to buy discounted tickets, users must convince ticket sellers that their attributes (i.e. age, profession, location) satisfy the ticket price policies. Hence, privacy issues have been the primary concerns of e-tickets users.
INTRODUCTION
Smart ticketing is currently receiving much attention in the UK as a mean to improve the customer experience and efficiency of travel. The UK Government Autumn Statement 2016 on Transport announced "80 million GBP will be allocated to accelerate the rollout of smart ticketing including season tickets for commuters in the UK's major cities" [43] . Due to their flexibility and portability, electronic tickets (e-tickets) systems have already been focused on extensively by industries [2, 3, 26] and academic research communities [35, 36, 46] . E-tickets are substituting paper tickets as they can reduce paper costs and improve customers' experiences. However it is imperative that any smart ticketing system is secure and preserves customer privacy.
In e-ticket systems, different users may buy different price tickets depending on ticket price policies. To purchase discounted tickets users must provide information about the attributes related to the discount, e.g. age, professional, location, etc. For example, in the rail transport sector, a user with a disabled railcard can buy a discounted ticket. Therefore, users' privacy is being challenged and potentially exposed. Hence, privacy-preserving e-ticket schemes (PPETs) were proposed [4, 27, 28, 31, 35, 44] . However, none of these schemes were formally proven. Hence, there still is a big gap between PPETSs and real e-ticket systems. This paper aims to bridge this gap by proposing a new PPETS to protect users' privacy and implement fine-grained pricing.
Related Work
So far, PPETSs with distinct features have been proposed. In these schemes, blind signature [17] , group signature [19] , anonymous credential [18] and pseudonym [19, 34] were used to protect users' privacy. Mut-Puigserver et al. [36] surveyed e-ticket systems, and summarised functionality and security requirements in e-ticket systems. Functionality requirements include expire date, reduced size, portability, flexibility, etc. Security requirements include integrity, authentication, fairness, non-overspending, anonymity, transferability, unlinkability, etc. In this paper, we mainly focus on flexibility, non-overspending, anonymity, transferability and unlinkability. Eticket schemes are classified into different types: transferable tickets [28, 46] , untransferable tickets [29, 35] , multi-use tickets [35, 36] and single-use tickets [28, 35, 38, 46] . E-Ticket Schemes from Blind Signatures. In a blind signature scheme, a user can obtain a signature on a message without the signer knowing the message. Based on the blind signature scheme proposed by Chaum [17] , Fan and Lei [22] proposed an e-ticket system for voting. In [22] , each voter can vote for a sequence of voting using only one ticket. Song and Korba [44] proposed an eticket scheme to protect users' privacy and provide non-repudiation in pay-TV systems. Quercia and Hailes [41] proposed an e-ticket scheme for mobile transactions. In [41] , the blind signature [17] was adopted to generate tickets and two types of tickets were considered, namely limited-use tickets and unlimited-use tickets. Milutinovice et al. [35] proposed an e-ticket scheme where the partial blind signature scheme [1] , commitment scheme [39] and anonymous credential [13] were explored together to protect users' privacy.
E-Ticket Schemes from Group Signatures.
A group signature enables a user to sign on a message on behalf of the group without exposing his identity, while the group manager can release the identity of the real signer. Nakanishi et al. [37] proposed an electronic coupon (e-coupon) scheme where the group signature scheme [15] was used to provide anonymity and unlinkability. Vives-Guasch [45] proposed an automatic fare collection (AFC) system where the group signature scheme [10] was used to provide unlinkability and revocable anonymity. Gudymenko [27] addressed users' privacy and fine-grained billing issues in e-ticket schemes, and used group signatures to make tickets untraceable. Nevertheless, in [27] , there were no formal security models and security proofs.
E-Ticket Schemes from Anonymous Credentials. In an anonymous credential scheme, a user can prove to a verifier that he/she has obtained a credential without releasing any other information to the latter. Heydt-Benjamin et al. [28] introduced anonymous credentials, e-cash and proxy re-encryption schemes into e-ticket systems to enhance security and privacy in public transport systems. In [28] , passive RFID transponders and higher powered computing devices are required. Arfaoui et al. [4] first modified the signature scheme proposed in [8] to eliminate expensive pairing operations in the verification phase, and then proposed a privacy-preserving near field communication (NFC) mobile ticket (m-ticket) system by combing the modified signature with the anonymous credential scheme [14] . In [4] , a user can anonymously use an m-ticket at most k times, otherwise he/she is revoked by the revocation authority.
E-Ticket Schemes from Pseudonyms. A pseudonym allows users to interact with multiple organisations anonymously and unlinkably by proving a statement about his/her relationship with others. Fujimura and Nakajima [24] proposed a general-purpose e-ticket framework where anonymity was achieved by using pseudonym schemes [21, 25] . Jorns et al. [30] first proposed a pseudonym scheme which can be implemented on constrained devices, and then used it to protect users' privacy in e-ticket systems. Kuntze and Schmidt [32] proposed a scheme to generate pseudonym tickets by using the identities embedded in attestation identity keys (AIKs) certified by the privacy certificate authority (PCA). Vives-Guasch et al. [47] proposed a light-weight e-ticket scheme and addressed exculpability and reusability. In [47] , a pseudonym was adopted to provide unlinkability of users' transactions. Kerschbaum et al. [31] considered the privacy-preserving billing issue in e-ticket schemes and applied pseudonyms to provide transactions' unlinkability.
E-Ticket from Special Devices. There are other e-ticket schemes designed using special devices, including personal trusted device (PTD) [20] , trusted platform module (TPM) [32] , mobile handsets (i.e. smart phones) [33] , etc.
Contributions
E-ticket schemes attract lots of research attentions due to their flexibility and portability. Nevertheless, privacy issues have been the primary concern of users. PPETs have been proposed, but these schemes were not formally treated in terms of security models and proofs, except [4] . In 2015, Arfaoui et al. [4] formally defined the security models for e-ticket schemes, including unforgeability, unlinkability and non-frameability, but the security proofs in [4] were sketchy. [27] and [31] addressed privacy-preserving pricing 
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A negligible function in ℓ issue, but these schemes were not proven. Hence, how to construct a provable PPETS-FGP is still a challenging and interesting problem. In this paper, we propose a new e-ticket scheme to implement privacy protection and fine-grained pricing. The proposed scheme provides the following features: (1) For a service, different users can buy different price tickets without releasing their exact attributes; (2) Each user's transaction records cannot been linked; (3) Tickets cannot been transferred and double spent; (4) The security of the proposed scheme is formally proven and reduced to well-know (q-strong Diffie-Hellman) complexity assumptions. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first provable e-ticket scheme where both privacy-preserving and fine-grained pricing are addressed.
Organisation
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the preliminaries used throughout this paper are introduced. The concrete construction and security analysis of our PPETS-FGP are presented in Section 3 and Secion 4, respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the preliminaries used throughout this paper are described. All notation used in this paper are explained in Table 1 .
Formal Definition
A PPETS-FGP scheme consists of the following four entities: central authority CA, user U, ticket seller S and ticket verifier V. • CA authenticates U and S, and issues anonymous credentials to them; • U registers to CA, obtains anonymous credentials from CA, purchases tickets from S, and proves the possession of tickets to V; • S registers to CA and sells tickets to U according to the ticket price policies; • V validates the tickets provided by U and detects whether a ticket is double spent.
The workflow of our PPETS-FGP is presented in Fig. 1 .
A PPETS-FGP is formally defined as follows:
• Setup(1 ℓ ) → (MSK, params, P). CA inputs a security parameter 1 ℓ , and outputs the system master secret key MSK, public parameters params and a universal set P of ticket price policies.
•
This algorithm is an interactive algorithm executed between S and CA or U and CA. This algorithm consists of the following two sub-algorithms: S's registration SRegistration and U's registration URegistration.
SRegistration(S(ID
to generate a secret-public key pair (SK S , PK S ), inputs his/her identity ID S , the secret-public key pair (SK S , PK S ) and the public parameters params, and outputs a credential σ S which is generated by CA. CA inputs its master secret key, the public key PK S and the public parameters params, and outputs (ID S , PK S ).
URegistration(U(ID
to generate a secret-public key pair (SK U , PK U ), inputs his/her identity ID U , attributes A U , secret-public key pair (SK U , PK U ) and the public parameters params, and outputs a credential σ U which is generated by CA. CA inputs the master secret key MSK, U's attributes A U , public key PK U and the public parameters params, and outputs (ID U , PK U ).
• Ticket-Issuing(U(SK U , PK U , A U , σ U , Ps U , P,T ime, Serv, params) ↔ S(SK S , PK S , Ps U , P,Time, Serv, params)) → (T U , (Ps U , Serv)). This is an interactive algorithm executed between U and S. U inputs his secret-public key pair (SK U , PK U ), attributes A U , credential σ U , a pseudonym Ps U , the ticket price policies P, the valid period T ime, a service Serv and the public parameters params, and outputs a ticket T U . S inputs his secret-public key pair (SK S , PK S ), U's pseudonym Ps U , the ticket price policies P, the valid period time Time, the service Serv and the public parameters params, and outputs (Ps U , Serv).
• Ticket-Validating(U(SK U , PK U ,T U ,Time, Serv, params) ↔ V(Time, Serv, params)) → (0/1, (Serv,Trans)). This is an interactive algorithm executed between U and V. U inputs his secret-public key pair (SK U , PK U ), ticket T U , the valid period Time, the service Serv and the public parameters params, and output 1 if the ticket T U is valid; otherwise it outputs 0 to indicate fail. V inputs the valid period T ime, the service Serv and the public parameters params, and outputs (Serv,Trans) where Trans is the transcript of the ticket validation.
• Double-Spend-Detecting(Trans, params) → (PK U , ⊥). V inputs the transcriptTrans and the public parameters params and outputs U's public key PK U if U double spends a ticket; otherwise it outputs ⊥ to indicate that there is no double spend ticket.
Definition 2.1. A privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme with fine-grained pricing (PPETS-FGP) is correct if
Security Models
The security of PPETS-FGP is defined by the indistinghuishability of a real-world experiment and an ideal-world experiment [16, 40] .
Definition 2.2. Let Real E, A (ℓ) be the probability that the enviornment E outputs 1 when running in the real world with the adversary A and Ideal E, A ′ be the probability that E outputs 1 when running in the ideal world with the adversary A ′ . A set of cryptographic protocols is said to securely implement the function-
The Real-World Experiment. We first present how the PPETS-FGP works where the central authority CA, the ticket seller S and the user U and the ticket verifier V are honest. The entities controlled by the real-world adversary A can deviate arbitrarily from their behaviours described below. CA runs Setup(1 ℓ ) → (MSK, params, P) to generate the master secret key msk, system public parameters params and the universal set of ticket price polices P, and sends params and P to U, S and V.
When receiving a registration message reдistration from E, S executes the seller registration algorithm SRegistration with CA. S runs KG(1 ℓ ) → (SK S , PK S ), takes as input his identity ID S , the secret-public key pair (SK S , PK S ) and the public parameters params, outputs a credential σ S . CA takes inputs his master secret key MSK, S's public key PK S and the public parameters params, and outputs S's identity I D S and public key PK S . S sends a bit b ∈ {0, 1} to E to show whether the SRegistation algorithm succeed (b = 1) or failed (b = 0).
When receiving a registration message (reдistration, A U ) from E, U executes the user registration algorithm URegistration with CA. U runs KG(1 ℓ ) → (SK U , PK U ), takes as input his identity ID U , attributes A U , secret-public key pair (SK U , PK U ) and the public parameters params, and outputs a credential σ U . CA takes inputs his master secret key MSK, U's public key PK U and the public parameters params, and outputs S's identity ID S , attributes A U and public key PK S . S sends a bitb ∈ {0, 1} to E to show whether the URegistation algorithm succeed (b = 1) or failed (b = 0).
When receiving a ticket issuing message (A U ,Time, Serv) from E, U first checks whether he has got a credential for A U . If so, U executes the ticket issuing algorithm Ticket-Issuing with S. U takes as inputs his secret-public key pair (SK U , PK U ), attributes A U , a pseudonym Ps U , his credential σ U , the valid period Time, the service Serv and the public parameters params. S takes as input his secret-public key pair (SK S , PK S ), the valid period T ime, the service Serv and the public parameters params. Finally, U obtains a ticket T U or ⊥ to show failure. S outputs U's pseudonym Ps U and the service Serv. If the ticket issue is successful, U sends a bitb ∈ {0, 1} to E to show the Ticket-Issuing algorithm succeed
When receiving a ticket validation message (T U ,Time, Serv, params) from E, U first checks whether he has the ticket T U which includes the valid period time Time and the service Serv. If so, U executes the ticket validating algorithm Ticket-Validating with V; otherwise U outputs ⊥ to show he does not have the ticket T U . If U has the ticket T U , he takes as input his secret-public key pair (SK U , PK U ), the ticket T U , the valid period Time, the service Serv and the system public parameters params, and output a bit b ∈ {0, 1} to show whether the ticket is valid (b = 1) or invalid (b = 0). V takes input the valid period time Time, the service Serv and the public parameters params, and outputs the service Serv and the transcript Trans. Finally, ifb = 1, U returns success; otherwise U returns f ail.
When receiving a double spend detecting message (T rans, params) from E, V first checks that whether there is a (Trans ′ , params) with Trans = Trans ′ . If so, V returns a bitb = 1 to indicate that it is a double spend ticket; otherwiseb = 0 is returned to show that the ticket is not been double spent.
The Ideal-World Experiment. In the ideal world experiment, there are the same entitles as those in real world experiment, including the central authority CA ′ , ticket seller S ′ , user U ′ and tikcet verifier V ′ . All communications among these entities must go through a trusted party TP. The behaviour of TP is described as follows. TP maintains four lists which are initially empty: a ticket seller credential list SCL, a user credential list UCL, a ticket list UT L for each user and a ticket validating list TV L.
When receiving a registration message reдistration from S ′ , TP sends (S ′ , reдistration) to CA ′ and obtains a bit ν ∈ {0, 1} from CA ′ . If ν = 1, TP adds S ′ into SCL and sends ν to S ′ ; otherwise, TP sends ν = 0 to S ′ to indicate failure.
When receiving a registration message (reдistration, A U ′ ) from U ′ , TP sends (U ′ , A U ′ , reдistration) to CA ′ and obtains a bitν ∈ {0, 1} from CA ′ . Ifν = 1, TP adds (U ′ , A U ′ ) into UCL and sendsν to U ′ ; otherwise, TP sendsν = 0 to S ′ to indicate failure.
When receiving a ticket issuing message (ticket_issuinд,
When receiving a ticket validating message (ticket_validatinд,
When receiving a double spend detecting message (double_spend _detectinд,T U ′ ) from U ′ , TP checks whether T U ∈ UV L. If it is, TP returnsν = 1 to U ′ to indicate it is double spend; otherwise,ν = 0 is returned to show it is not double spent.
The entities CA ′ , S ′ , U ′ and V ′ in ideal world simply relay the inputs and outputs between E and TP.Security Properties. It is obvious that the ideal-world experiment can provide the following properties.
User's Privacy. S ′ dose not know users' identities and their exact attributes, namely S ′ only knows that a user buys a ticket for which he/she has the required attributes. Even if S ′ colludes with V ′ and potentially with other users, they can only try to know that the attributes required by the ticket policies.
Seller's Security. U ′ cannot generate a ticket on behalf of the seller S ′ . Even if U ′ colludes with CA ′ and potentially other users and V ′ , they cannot forge a valid ticket.
Therefore, both user's privacy and seller's security can be achieved in the real-world experiment due to the indistinguishability between the real-world experiment and ideal-world experiment.
Bilinear Group
Let G 1 , G 2 and G τ be cyclic group with prime order p. A map e : G 1 × G 2 → G τ is a bilinear group if the following properties are satisfied [9] :
(1) Bilinearity.
(2) Non-gegeneration. For all д ∈ G 1 and h ∈ G 2 , e(д, h) 1 τ where 1 τ is the identity element in G τ ; (3) Computatioability. For all д ∈ G 1 and h ∈ G 2 , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(д, h). In the case that G 1 = G 2 , e is called symmetric bilinear map. Let BG(1 ℓ ) → (e, p, G, G τ ) be a symmetric bilinear group generator which takes as input a security parameter 1 ℓ and outputs a bilinear group (e, p, G, G τ ) with prime order p and e : G × G → G τ .
Complexity Assumptions
Definition 2.3. (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Assumption) Let BG(1 ℓ ) → (e, p, G, G τ ), д be a generator of G and x R ← Z p . We say that q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on G if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A given (д, д x , д x 2 , · · · , д x q ) can output a pair (c, д 1 x +c ) with negligible probability, namely
where c ∈ Z p [8] .
Zero-Knowledge Proof
In this paper, we use zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocols to prove knowledge of statements about discrete logarithms [7] , including discrete logarithm, equality, product, disjunction and conjunction. We follow the notation proposed in [15] and formalised in [12] . By
we denote a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of α, β and γ such that A = д α h β andÃ =д αhγ holds in groups G andG simultaneously where G = ⟨д⟩ = ⟨h⟩ andG = ⟨д⟩ = ⟨h⟩. Conventionally, the values in the parenthesis (α, β, γ ) denote quantities of which knowledge is being proven, while the other values are public to the verifier.
Boneh-Boyen (BB) Signature
In 2004, Boneh and Boyen [8] proposed a short signature scheme. This scheme was used to construct efficient set-mebership proof and range proof [11] . In this paper, we use this signature scheme to generate tags for ticket price policies. This scheme works as follows.
KeyGen. Let BG(1 ℓ ) → (e, p, G, G τ ) and д 1 , д 2 be generators of G.
The signer generates a secret-public key pair (x, Y ) where x R ← Z p and Y = д x 2 . Signing. To sign on a message m ∈ Z p , the signer computes the
Verifying. To verify whether σ is a signature on the message m, the verifier checks e(σ , Yд m 2 )
Theorem 2.4. The Boneh-Boyen signature is (T , q S , ϵ(ℓ))-secure against existentially forgery under the weak chosen message attacks if the (T ′ , q, ϵ ′ (ℓ))-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption holds on (e, p, G, G τ ), where q s is the number of signing queries made by the adversary
Signature with Efficient Protocol
Au et al. [5] proposed a signature with efficient protocol scheme and named it as BBS+ signature. This signature scheme is used to issue credentials to users and ticket sellers, and generate tickets for users in our PPETS-FGP. This scheme works as follows. 
Signing. To sign on a block of messages
Verifying. To verify whether (w, s, σ ) is a valid signature on (m 1 , m 2 ,
Theorem 2.5. This signature with efficient protocol is (T , q S , ϵ(ℓ))-existentially unforgeable under the adaptively chosen message attacks if the (T ′ , q, ϵ ′ (ℓ))-strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption holds on (e, p, G, G τ ), where q S is the number of signing queries made by the adversary
Proof of The Signature. To prove (w, s, σ ) is a signature on (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ), the prover selects r 1 , r 2 R ← Z p , and computes A 1 = σд 2 . Let t 1 = wr 1 and t 2 = wr 2 . The proof is as follows:
Theorem 2.6. Π is an honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol with special soundness [5] .
PPETS-FGP: PRIVACY-PRESERVING ELECTRONIC TICKET SYSTEM WITH FINE-GRAINED PRICING
In this section, we describe the formal construction of our PPETS-FGP scheme. Our scheme is derived from the signature with efficient protocol scheme [5] , set-membership proof scheme and range proof scheme [11] , commitment scheme [39] and e-cash [6] . In [11] , a value can be proven in a set or a range, while the value is not certified by a trusted party and multiple sets and ranges were not considered. In [6] , a double spend user can be detected, but users' attributes were not addressed.
Challenges. When using the range proof and set-membership proof [11] to construct our PPETS-FGP, there are some technical challenges: (1) The values (i.e. ages, mileages) which users prove to ticket sellers should be certified by a trusted authority; otherwise, users can buy discounted tickets which they do not have the corresponding attributes; (2) To protect users' privacy and implement untransferability, tickets are generated by using anonymous credential schemes and include users' personal information. Hence, detecting double spend users is difficult since two proofs of one ticket cannot be linked and the verifier does not have any information of users; (3) Range proof and set-membership proof can be used simultaneously to prove that values included in a credential are in some sets and ranges, especially since there are multiple range policies and set policies.
Techniques. To overcome the hurdles above, the following techniques are adopted: (1) The signature scheme [5] is used to certified users' attribute values (i.e. age, mileage, profession, location, etc.).
As a result, all the values which are included in the credentials and need to be proven can be expressed in discrete logarithm formules, then can be proven using the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol [7] ; (2) To detect double spend users, each ticket is bound with a serial number and the public trace technique in [6] is used. If there are two transcripts including the same serial number, the double spend user can be detected and revoked by releasing his/her identity (public key); (3) Various tags are constructed to support both range proofs and set-membership proofs.
High-Level Overview
In e-ticket systems, ticket prices mainly depend on two kinds of policies: range policies and set policies. The range policies include attributes, for example age, mileage, etc.; while the set policies consist of various other attributes, such as profession, disability, location, etc. In this paper, we focus on both range policies and set policies. Each policy determins a price, such as 50% off policy, 30% off policy, etc. For example, in UK, users can by 30% off ticket using 16-25 railcards [42] if: (1) they are between 16 to 25; (2) they are over 25, but full-time students. Our PPETS-FGP works as follows.
Setup. CA publishes the ticket price polices
be range policies and {P 1 , · · · , P N 2 } be set policies. Suppose that the longest interval length in
U generates a secret-public key pair (x u , Y U ), submits his/her attributes A U which enable him/her to get special tickets, and authenticates himself/herself to CA. A U consists of U's age, mileage, profession, location, etc. If the authentication is successful, CA issues a credential
x +cu , a l is the vale of U's attribute in the range policy
. Cred U includes U's public key Y U and attributes A U , and enables U to prove that his/her attributes have been certified by CA.
Ticket Issuing. To resist illegal entities to collect users' private information, S proves to U that he/she is authorised by CA using Cred S . If the proof is successful, U generates a pseudonym Y = ξ x u д r 1 where x u is his/her secret key and r is a random number, and proves to S that he/she holds attributes which enable he/she to buy a discounted ticket and are certified by CA. If the proof is successful, S generates a ticket
1 xs +ωu , s u = H (Y ||Time ||Service ||Price ||V alid _Period) is a serial number, Time is the purchasing date, Service is the service name, price is the ticket price and V alid_Period is the valid period of the ticket. Actually, (d u , ω u ,T u ) is a BBS+ signature on x u . The ticket Ticket U in our PPETS-FGP is untransferable and single-use.
Ticket Validation. To use a ticket, U proves to V that the possession of the ticket Ticket U . If the proof is successful, V grants the service to U and stores the proof transcript trans; otherwise, V denies the request. Double Spend Detecting. To detect whether a ticket is being double spent, V checks whether there exist two transcripts trans which includes the same information. If it is, the tickets are being double spent; otherwise, it is a fresh ticket.
Construction
The construction of our PPETS-FGP is described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3,  Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 .
CA publishes the ticket price polices
is a range policy (i.e. age, mileage) and P i = {I i 1 , I i 2 , · · · , I i ς } is a set policy (i.e. location, profession, disbility) and consists of ς items I i j for l = 1, 2, · · · , N 1 and i = 1, 2, · · · , N 2 . CA runs BG(1 ℓ ) → (e, p, G, G τ ). Suppose that the longest interval length in 
and
The secret key of CA is MSK = (x, y, µ 1 , µ 2 , · · · , µ N ) and the public parameters are params Verifies e(σ S ,дд c s )
Selects r R ← Z p and compute R = g r .
Computes the proof Π 1 U :
Verifies e(σ U ,дд c u ) = e(д 0 , д) · e(ξ , д) · e(g, д) r u · where a l ∈ A U |= R l and A U |= I i j . Correctness. Our PPETS-FGP scheme is correct as defined in Section 2.1 (see Appendix A).
The details of zero-knowledge proofs used in our PPETS-FGP are presented by using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [23] in Appendix B.
In addition, this scheme also addresses the security and privacy issues which are covered in the next two properties.
Transaction Unlinkability. When buying a ticket, U proves to S that he/she holds the attributes required by the discounted ticket without releasing them and provides a pseudonym to S. Later, U proves to V that he/she has obtained a ticket which includes his/her pseudonym. Since all proofs are zero-knowledge, users' transactions cannot be linked by CA, S and V, even if they can collude.
Ticket Untransferability. Both tickets and pseudonyms includes users' secret keys x u . When using a ticket Ticket U , U needs to prove the knowledge of x u and the possession of Ticket U . Hence, tickets are untransferable.
, where
where
Computes the proof
1 xs +ωu where s u = H (Y ||Time ||Service ||Price ||V alid_Period). 
Keeps the ticket Ticket
U = (d u , s u , ω u ,T u ).
SECURITY ANALYSIS
To prove the security of our PPETS-FGP, indistinguishability between the behaviours of the real-world adversary A and the behaviours of the ideal-world adversary A ′ is proven. Given a realworld adversary A, there exist an ideal-world adversary A ′ such that no environment E can distinguish whether it is interacting with A or A ′ . The proof is based on sublemmas where different corrupted parties are considered. The following cases are not considered as they are meaningless: (1) CA is the only honest party; (2) CA is the only dishonest party; (3) All parties are honest; and (4) All parties are dishonest. Since CA needs to know U's attributes to issue a ticket to him/her, we assume that CA is honest and fully trusted by other entities in the system.
In order to prove the indistinguishability between A and A ′ , a sequence of games Game 0 , Game 1 , · · · , Game n are defined. For each Game i , we construct a simulator Sim i that runs A as a subroutine and provides E's view, for i = 0, 1, · · · , n. Hybrid E,Sim i (ℓ) denotes the probability that E outputs 1 running in the world provided by Sim i . Sim 0 runs A and other honest parties in the realworld experiment, hence Hybrid E,Sim 0 = Real E, A . Sim n runs A ′ in ideal-world experiment, hence Hybrid E,Sim n (ℓ) = Ideal E, A ′ (ℓ). = ξ x u (r ′ −r ) and
Hence, U with public key Y U is a double spend user.
Figure 6: Double Spend Detecting
Therefore,
Theorem 4.1. Our privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme with fine-grained pricing (PPETS-FGP) described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig.  4 , Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 securely implements the PPETS-FGP functionality if the q-strong Diffie-Hellamn assumption (q-SDH) holds on the bilinear group (e, p, G, G τ ).
Lemma 4.2. For all environments E and all real-world adversaries
A who controls the ticket seller S and verifier V, there exists a idealword adversary A ′ such that
Proof. To simplify this proof, let U be a single honest user since A can simulate other users by himself.
Game-1. When E first makes ticket-issuing queries, the simulator Sim 1 runs the extractor of the proof of knowledge
If the extractor fails, Sim 1 returns E with ⊥ to show the failure; otherwise, Sim 1 runs A to interact with the honest user. The difference between Hybrid E,Sim 0 and Hybrid E,Sim 1 lies in the knowledge error of the proof of knowledge, hence
Game-2. The simulator Sim 2 works exactly as Sim 1 except that it lets the honest user U to query a ticket for which his attributes A U satisfy the ticket policy P, namely A U |= P. Due to the (perfect) zeroknowledgeness of the proof of knowledge, Sim 2 runs a simulated proof of knowledge:
We have
Game-3. The simulator Sim 3 runs exactly as Sim 2 , except that it lets the honest user U to valid his/her ticket. Due to the (perfect) zeroknowledgeness of the proof of knowledge, Sim 3 runs a simulated proof:
We have
Hybrid E,Sim 2 − Hybrid E,Sim 3 = 0.
Game-4. According to the real-world advesary A, we construct an ideal-world adversary A ′ that plays the simultaneous roles of the seller S ′ and the verifier V ′ , and incorporate all steps from Game 3 . A ′ runs A to obtain system parameters params. When receiving a user U ′ registration query (reдistration, A U ′ ) from the trusted third party TP, A ′ executes the side of the user U with A. If the credential is valid, A ′ sendsṽ = 1 to T P and adds (U ′ , A ′ U ) to UCL; otherwise,ν = 0 is returned. For the first time that it receives a ticket issue query (ticket_issuinд, A U ′ ,Time, Serve) from TP, it runs A to obtain the elements (x s , c s , r s , σ S , z, v). A ′ simulates a honest user U's query on (ticket_issuinд, A U ′ ,Time, Serve) . If the ticket is valid, A ′ sendsν = 1 to TP adds (A U ′ ,Time, Sevrv) to USL; otherwise,ν = 0 is returned to show failure. When receiving a ticket validating query (T U ,Time, Serv, params) from TP, A ′ run A to obtain the transcript Trans of the proof of knowledge of 
□ Lemma 4.3. For all environments E and all real-world adversaries
A who controls the verifier V and one or more users Us, there exists a ideal-word adversary A ′ such that
where q T , q I , q V are the number of ticket issue queries made by A, credential queries made by A and ticket validation queries made by A, respectively.
Proof. Our PPETS-FGP prevents users from pooling their credentials, hence we should consider multiple users, some of which are corrupted and some of which are honest.
Game-1. For each ticket issuing query from a corrupted user dictated by E, the simulator Sim 1 runs the extractor for the proof of knowledge
). If the extractor fails, Sim 1 returns ⊥ to E to indicate failure; otherwise, Sim 1 runs A interacting with the honest ticket seller. The difference between Hybrid E,Sim 0 and Hybrid E,Sim 1 is
2 ℓ where q T is the number of ticket issue queries. Game-2. The simulator Sim 2 runs exactly as Sim 1 except that Sim 2 returns ⊥ to E if one of the credentials (c u , r u , σ U = Cϑ −α ) is not generated by the Join algorithm. Actually,(c u , r u , σ U = Cϑ −α ) is a forged BBS+ signature [5] 
). For the case that multiple corrupted users pool their credentials, one of the pooled credentials must have a different x u than when it was issued since only a single x u is extracted, hence is a forged credential. Due to the security of the signature scheme [5] , the difference between Hybrid E,Sim 2 and Hybrid E,Sim 1 is the following lemma. Claim 1. We claim that
where q I is the number of crendentail queries made by the adversary A.
Game-3. The simulator Sim 3 runs exactly as
. In this case, there exists at least one
i is a forged BB signature [8] . The difference between Hybrid E,Sim 3 and Hybrid E,Sim 2 is bounded by the following lemma.
Claim 2. We claim that
Hybrid E,Sim 3 − Hybrid E,Sim 2 ≤ Adv
Game-4. The simulator Sim 4 runs exact as Sim 4 except that there exists at least an
is a forged BB signature on H (i j ). The difference between Hybrid E,Sim 4 and Hybrid E,Sim 3 is bounded by the following lemma.
Claim 3. We claim that
Game-5. The simulator Sim 5 runs exactly as Sim 4 except that Sim 5 returns tickets to E. At the first ticket issuing query dictated by E, Sim 5 runs the simulated proof of knowledge
The tickets (d u , ω u ,T u ) for each ticket issuing query is computed by using the signing oracle in [5] . The following lemma is used to bound the difference between Hybrid E,Sim 6 and Hybrid E,Sim 6 . Claim 4. We claim that
where q T is the number of ticket issuing queries made by A Game-6. The simulator Sim 6 runs exactly as Sim 5 except that Sim 6 runs the extractor of the proof of knowledge
. If the extraction fails, Sim 7 returns ⊥ to E; otherwise, it continue to run A interacting with the honest verifier V. The difference between Hybrid E,Sim 6 and Hybrid E,Sim 5 is
Hybrid E,Sim 6 − Hybrid E,Sim 5 ≤ q V 2 ℓ where q V is the number of ticket validation queries.
Game-7. The simulator Sim 7 runs exactly as Sim 6 except that Sim 7 returns ⊥ to E if at least one of the extracted
was not generated by the Ticket Issuing algorithm. Actually,
For multiple users case, one of the pooled tickets must have a different x ′ u than when it was issue since only one x u is extracted, hence
The following lemma is used to bound the difference between Hybrid E,Sim 8 and Hybrid E,Sim 7 .
Claim 5. We claim that
Game-8. Now, based on the real-world adversary A, we construct an ideal-word adversary A ′ . A ′ runs A to obtain params and Y S . After receiving a ticket issue query (A U ′ ,Time, Serv) from TP, A ′ runs A to returns a simulated proof of the knowledge:
. If the signature can be generated correctly, TP returns A ′ a bitν = 1; otherwiseν = 0 is returned. After receiving a ticket validation query (ticket_validatinд,T U ′ ) from V ′ , A ′ runs A to execute the proof of knowledge
If the proof is correct, TP returns A ′ a bitν = 1 to and adds (U ′ ,T U ′ ) into TV L; otherwise,ν = 0 is returned. After receiving a double spend detecting query (double_spend_detectinд,T U ′ ) from V ′ , TP checks where T U ′ is in TV L. If it is, TP returns V ′ a biť ν = 1; otherwise,ν = 0 is returned. A ′ provides A with the same environment as Sim 7 did, hence we have
Therefore, we have
Proof of Claim 1. This claim is proven by constructing an algorithm B that can break the unforgeability under the adaptively chosen message attacks of BBS+ signature [5] . From the security proof presented in [5] , there exist a polynomial-time algorithm B that can break the q I -SDH assumption with non-negligible advantage. Suppose that the adversary A can distinguish Game-1 and
B sends q I messages (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m q I ) to the challenger C, and
. For q I ticket issuing queries, B selects one and referred as querỹ Q = (Ỹ ,Time, Service, Price, V alid_Period). For q I − 1 queries other than queryQ, B responses using the q I − 1 pairs (m i , σ i ) as follows.
Suppose that A query ticket on (Y ,Time, Service, Price, V alid _Period), since B extracts the knowledge of (x u , c u ,
← Z p , and
For the queryQ whereỸ = ξxдd 1 , B selectsd ′ ∈ Z p such that d ′ +d +cx +bs =ãβ and computes 1 xs +ω * . B runs A to extract (x * , d * ). We consider the following three cases.
β (xs +ω * )
= ρã xs +ω * ρ t * ((xs +ω * −ω * +α )γ −1) β (xs +ω * )
Case-II (ω * = m i and T * = T i ) or (ω * =α and T * =T ): These happen with negligible probability except that A can solves the related discrete logarithm amongst of two of д 0 , д 1 , д 2 and ξ .
Case-III (ω * ∈ (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m q I ,α)) and T * T i or T * T : If it is, ω * =α with the probability 1
Proof of Claim 2. This claim is proven by constructing an algorithm B that can break the unforgeability under the weak chosen message attacks of BB signature [8] . By the security proof given in [8] , there exists an polynomial-time algorithm B that can break the (q + 1)-SDH assumption with non-negligible advantage.
Suppose that an adversary A can distinguish Game-2 and Game-3. Given (h, h y , h y 2 , · · · , h y q+1 ), B aims to output (c, h 
) with e(A w i ,h) = e(h, h) t i ·e(A w i , h) −w i and e(A ′ w i ,h) = e(h, h) t i ·e(A ′ w i , h) −w ′ i . Hence, h w i = (A w i ) 
CONCLUSIONS
To protect users' privacy in e-ticket schemes, PPETSs have been proposed, however they have not previously been treated formally. This paper presents the first formal treatment of a PPETS scheme. Furthermore it introduces new features of such a scheme, to implement fine-grained pricing while protecting users' privacy. The distinct features of our PPETS-FGP are as follows: (1) For a service, different users can buy different price tickets without releasing their exact attributes; (2) Each user's transaction record cannot be linked; (3) Tickets cannot be transferred and double spent; (4) The security of the proposed scheme was formally proven, and reduced to well-known ( q-SDH) complexity assumptions. Our PPETS-FGP can be modified to support travel linkability so that users can calculate their mileages. Let 
FUTURE WORK
This scheme will also be evaluated with respect to its application to smart ticketing within the UK Rail Industry [26] , in order to make moving through stations and trains easier and quicker. Key aspects to focus on will be the efficiency of the scheme in its implementation and performance in the railway system. Attribute scalability will also be considered to improve the flexibility of the proposed PPETS-FGP.
−w ′ i = e(h, h)
e(B i j ,η i ) = e(η , η)
= e(η, η) e i · e(B i j , η) H (I i j ) . 
Hence, e(F , Y S ) e(д 0 , ρ) =e(ξ , ρ)
B DETAILS OF ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF
The details of zero-knowledge proofs used in our PPETS-FGP are described by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [23] as follows.
The Detail of 1 S :
The ticket seller S select t s S selects z, v,z,ṽ,ẑ,v,x s ,ṽ s ,c s
